A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgements: Views from the United States and Japan by Clermont, Kevin M.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 37
Issue 1 2004 Article 1
A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgements:
Views from the United States and Japan
Kevin M. Clermont
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clermont, Kevin M. (2004) "A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgements: Views from the United States and Japan," Cornell
International Law Journal: Vol. 37: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol37/iss1/1
A Global Law of Jurisdiction and
Judgments: Views from the
United States and Japan
Kevin M. Clermontt
In troduction ..................................................... 1
1. U .S. A pproach ............................................ 2
A . Basic Law ............................................ 2
1. Jurisdiction ........................................ 2
a. Pow er ......................................... 3
b. Unreasonableness and Self-Restraint ........... 6
c. Comparison to Japanese Law .................. 6
2. Judgm ents ......................................... 8
a. Recognition and Enforcement .................. 8
b. Res Judicata ................................... 10
c. Comparison to Japanese Law .................. 11
B. U.S. Views of the Draft Hague Convention ............. 12
II. Japanese Approach ...................................... 16
A. Representative Japanese view of the Draft Hague
C onvention ........................................... 16
B. Representative U.S. View of Japanese Law .............. 18
Il1. Specific Problem: Parallel Actions ........................ 20
A . U .S. Law ............................................. 20
B. Japanese Law ......................................... 21
C . Reconciliation ........................................ 22
IV. General Resolution: Bilateral Treaty ...................... 24
C onclusion ...................................................... 26
Introduction
A provocative recent book contends as follows: "In many areas of the
law, Japan and the United States track each other closely. In much of civil
procedure, they diverge radically."1 Included in the litany of clashing pro-
t Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. I would like to thank for their
invaluable help Samuel Baumgartner, Mitsuru Chino, Tsutoma Nagano, John Palmer,
Emily Sherwin, and Arthur von Mehren-and especially Kuo-Chang Huang with whom I
have written previously on these matters.
1. J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINoRu NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
150 (1999). Those authors attribute the radical differences to two sources: U.S. federal-
ism and juries. Although it is true that U.S. federalism complicates some of the details
of federal and state jurisdiction and judgments law, it does not alter the basic concepts.
The basic issues are how far a sovereign can reach and what a court's judgment decides,
and for these issues the federal government and the states both receive sovereign status
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cedural differences are the two countries' laws on jurisdiction and
judgments.
The authors contrast jurisdiction laws by comparing Japanese venue
to U.S. interstate jurisdiction; for the contrast of judgments laws, they com-
pare the contents of the two countries' res judicata provisions. 2 I, however,
shall contend that when the focus expands to international jurisdiction
and to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the comparative
picture becomes much more placid. Indeed, the picture even becomes
promising for further future alignment of the two countries' procedural
laws.
I. U.S. Approach
A. Basic Law
The U.S. law on jurisdiction and judgments admittedly has the reputa-
tion of being complicated, vague, and overreaching. That may be true to a
certain extent. But closer examination reveals that the essence of the U.S.
law is quite defensible-and should be quite understandable to the Japa-
nese in particular.
1. Jurisdiction3
For a court properly to undertake a civil adjudication, the court must
have territorial authority to adjudicate. This requirement confines the
place of litigation, putting restrictions on the court's authority to entertain
litigation with nonlocal elements. The basic U.S. law on the subject is this:
the forum acquires adjudicatory authority in civil cases through power over
the target of the action (be it a person or a thing), unless litigating the
action there is unreasonable (that is, fundamentally unfair)-although the
sovereign can naturally choose the self-restraint of exercising less than its
full adjudicatory authority.
The U.S. Supreme Court has formulated these principal limitations on
a court's territorial authority from the opaque few words of the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.4 It has largely elaborated U.S. law
on the interstate level and in fact has decided only a very few international
cases. 5 The United States has no treaties on international jurisdiction.
under the U.S. constitutional scheme. Thus, their answers resemble those that a foreign
sovereign, such as Japan, would reach.
2. See id. at 137-39, 144-45.
3. See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND
VENUE (1999).
4. As the Supreme Court finally made clear in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), due process dictates both that the forum state must have
power over the target of the action and that litigating the action there must be reasonable.
And the Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), further clarified
that while the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion as to power, it is up to the defen-
dant to show unreasonableness.
5. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), described infra note 10; Per-
kins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), described infra note 10; cf.
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a. Power
Prompted by the tensions among states in a federation, the United
States early adopted a theory of exclusive power based on territoriality:
each sovereign had jurisdiction, exclusive of all other sovereigns' jurisdic-
tion, to bind persons and things present within its territorial boundaries.
This old requirement of power remains very much a part of U.S. law
today. However, the scope of power has expanded beyond the basis of
physical presence. The common element in specifying the current bases of
power-the defining feature of the power test-is the narrow focus on
whether the relation of the target of the action to the sovereign constitutes
"minimum contacts," as opposed to a broader inquiry that would take
account of the plaintiffs and the public's interests.
This image of power inevitably raised the question of power over what
or whom, despite the undeniable fact that all actions really affected the
interests of people. That is, to measure the strength of the power relation
between the sovereign and the target of the action, the law had to specify
the target of the action. Thus, the American categorization of territorial
jurisdiction arose into jurisdiction over things and persons. That is, the
basic categories of jurisdiction are nonpersonal and personal jurisdiction.
Nonpersonal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, usu-
ally involves an action against a thing, or res. Theoretically, and often for-
mally, the action is against the thing. No personal liability or obligation
results.
6
Personal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction in personam, can result in a judg-
ment imposing a personal liability or obligation upon defendant in favor of
plaintiff or, more generally, diminishing the personal rights of a party in
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (construing Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure's implementation of international jurisdiction). In the Asahi case, the
Supreme Court split badly on the question of power in the stream-of-commerce context,
with a minority arguing that, to bestow jurisdiction, the manufacturer must have had an
active purpose to serve the market in the forum state where the product was sold. That
case's actual holding, however, was that regardless of power, jurisdiction in California
was unreasonable because of the unusual facts: the state could not inflict on a Japanese
valve manufacturer the burden of defending this indemnity claim by a Taiwanese tire-
tube manufacturer, when neither the Taiwanese party nor the forum state had substan-
tial interests in sustaining jurisdiction. Given all this ambiguous guidance, the lower
courts are now shaping a new consensus that only slightly shortens the prior jurisdic-
tional reach down the stream of commerce. Their decisions currently appear to provide
that the purchaser's state has power over a seller with an actual awareness of its prod-
ucts being regularly sold there, and that such personal jurisdiction normally will not be
unreasonable.
6. Nonpersonal jurisdiction includes the troublesome variety sometimes called
attachment jurisdiction, whereby the plaintiff seeks to apply the defendant's property to
the satisfaction of a claim against the defendant that is unrelated to the property. For
example, New York plaintiffs might obtain jurisdiction in a New York state court for a
tort claim arising from a plane crash in Turkey simply by garnishing a New York bank
account belonging to the defendant, Turkish Airlines. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441
F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). If successful, the plaintiff would apply the bank account
to awarded court costs and then to the satisfaction of the tort claim. However, on such
attachment jurisdiction, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to the bank account.
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favor of another party. This is the most common kind of jurisdiction. For
example, a successful tort action resting on personal jurisdiction subjects
all of the defendant's nonexempt assets to execution. For another example,
a suit for an injunction requires jurisdiction in personam and subjects the
defendant to the court's contempt sanctions.
While nonpersonal jurisdiction still requires physical presence of the
thing, personal jurisdiction can now rest on thinner connections. The rela-
tionships between the defendant and the forum sufficing to establish
power fall into several basic types. These are the primary bases of power
for personal jurisdiction. (Of course, to survive due process scrutiny, any
exercise of jurisdiction must not fail the more free-form test of unreasona-
bleness. Nevertheless, because of the predominant role of the power test,
cataloguing the primary bases of power is in fact an expressive means for
mapping the bounds on personal jurisdiction.)
Some of these bases of power rest on strong contacts between the
defendant and the forum, giving power to adjudicate any personal claim
whether or not related to those contacts. Thus, one says these bases sup-
port general jurisdiction. They each workably provide a predictably certain
forum, which usually is a fair one.
The ancient basis of presence gives power to adjudicate any personal
claim if the defendant is served with process within the sovereign's territo-
rial limits. Thus, even momentary presence of the defendant creates
power-so-called transient jurisdiction-to adjudicate a claim totally unre-
lated to that presence. 7
The basis of domicile gives power to adjudicate any personal claim if
the defendant is domiciled, or incorporated, in the territory when served
anywhere with process. "The state which accords him privileges and
affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may
also exact reciprocal duties."8
Other of these bases of power rest on lesser contacts between the
defendant and the forum, giving power to adjudicate only those personal
claims related to the contacts. Thus, these bases support specific jurisdic-
tion. They provide useful and indeed necessary jurisdiction, but can gener-
ate some very difficult problems of line-drawing.
An individual or corporate defendant may actually consent to personal
jurisdiction, thereby creating a basis of power defined by the terms of the
consent. The possibility of the defendant's limiting the consent justifies
classifying the consent basis under the heading of specific jurisdiction.
The defendant may express consent in a number of ways. The defendant
may consent before suit is brought, as in the common provision in business
contracts consenting to a particular state's jurisdiction, or as pursuant to
the common statutory requirement that anyone seeking a license to do bus-
iness in a state must appoint a local agent to accept service of process.
7. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (noting valid
service on defendant flying over the state).
8. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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Alternatively, the defendant may consent after suit is brought, by accepting
or waiving service of process, or by choosing not to object to personal
jurisdiction.9
A relatively new and very vibrant basis of power gives the state power
over an individual or corporation that has committed certain state-directed
acts, but the power extends only to those personal claims arising out of
those acts. 10 Important examples include the following: tortious acts; busi-
ness activity; property ownership, use, or possession; and litigating acts.
These examples should not give the idea that anything goes. The Supreme
Court has sometimes found the defendant's activity too slight to bestow
power on the state." Drawing the line is difficult. However phrased, the
test, in application, turns on a close inspection of the facts and circum-
stances peculiar to the case. The issue of minimum contacts "is one in
which few answers will be written in 'black and white. The grays are domi-
nant, and even among them the shades are innumerable. '""1 2
Speaking more generally, the critical defect in the U.S. law of jurisdic-
tion is the persistence of the power test. The difficulties with this test are
numerous. Most prominently, the power test remains undefinable, and
hence difficult to apply. It never produced exclusive jurisdiction. One
state's jurisdiction more evidently came to overlap other states' jurisdic-
tion, as the power test became increasingly metaphorical. Instead of look-
ing only to physical presence, courts looked to the in-state effects of the
defendant's acts or even to the quality and nature of the acts. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court has come to require "a sufficient connection between
the defendant and the forum [s]tate to make it fair to require defense of the
action in the forum."' 3 Whether it is "fair" to exercise power over the
9. See Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
10. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945). However, as the
level of the defendant's state-directed activity increases, the state's power extends to
claims less related to that activity. Both the level of activity and the degree of unrelated-
ness are continual. If state-directed activities are considerable, they bestow power even
though they might be called partial, parallel, or incidental to the activities that the claim
actually "arose from," because those state-directed activities sufficiently "relate to" the
claim. Indeed, if a defendant's business activities in the forum state when served with
process are extensively continuous and systematic-which is phrased as "doing busi-
ness" rather than merely "transacting business"-the defendant becomes subject to juris-
diction even on claims wholly unrelated to the in-state activities. In this way, the
development of the state-directed acts basis has brought into the open the absence of any
clear distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. See Perkins v. Benguet Con-
sol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (upholding jurisdiction in an Ohio state court suit
against a Philippine corporation, which was performing all of its management activities
in Ohio while mining was suspended by the effects of war in the Philippines, on a basi-
cally unrelated claim); cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984) (finding no general jurisdiction of Texas over a foreign corporation, but not
reaching the difficult issue of more specific jurisdiction).
11. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (finding jurisdiction
unconstitutional when, after a New York couple divorced and the wife and two children
moved to California, the wife brought a California state court suit seeking child support,
serving process on the husband in New York).
12. Id. at 92 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
13. Id. at 91.
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defendant must turn on the interests of others, and so the power test is
inevitably eroding into a reasonableness test. Currently, the power test
remains a complicated way station on the road to a better law of
jurisdiction.
b. Unreasonableness and Self-Restraint
Another result of the judicial elaboration of due process has been the
overlaying of an unreasonableness test onto the power test. The new test of
unreasonableness balances the opposing parties' interests, along with the
public's interests in the litigation. It also takes into account a diverse and
complete set of relevant considerations, such as the actualities of the
choice-of-law process. Although rather uncertain in application, this party-
neutral and all-things-considered test directly measures jurisdiction by the
pertinent standard of "fair play and substantial justice," that is, the mini-
mal floor of fundamental fairness in the broadest sense. The chosen forum
need not be the ideal forum, but the forum, even if it has power, must not
be an unreasonable one in light of all these interests in the litigation. 14
The state and federal sovereigns have in fact chosen to exercise less
than their full adjudicatory authority under the Constitution. These
choices find expression in a variety of statutes and doctrines. Most promi-
nent among them is the law of venue. Venue, at least as traditionally
defined, does not exhaust the subconstitutional restrictions on geographic
selection of forum. For example, forum non conveniens is a doctrine of
self-limitation, whereby a court may exercise its discretion and decline
existing territorial authority to adjudicate if the court is a seriously inap-
propriate forum and if a substantially more appropriate forum is available
to the plaintiff. Indeed, the sovereigns have developed a variety of statutes
and doctrines that decline, albeit usually in minor ways, constitutionally
permissible territorial authority to adjudicate with respect to certain non-
local cases. For another example, a state's statute might close its court-
house doors to any action between nonresidents on a claim arising outside
the state. Therefore, all of these self-imposed limitations form part of the
law of territorial authority to adjudicate, properly conceived.
Unreasonableness and self-restraint are similar in theory. The former
embodies the most basic aspects of fairness, and so the courts have forced
it on the law by means of constitutional interpretation. The latter restraints
are those that the federal and state governments have additionally chosen
to adopt as restrictions on themselves.
c. Comparison to Japanese Law
What should strike a Japanese audience is how familiar a lot of this
sounds, if only the U.S. jurisdictional law were limited to personal jurisdic-
tion, and then stripped of much of its history and some of its details.
14. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), described
supra note 5.
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Take this description of the essence of Japanese jurisdictional law:
First, the courts have developed the law from general principles, rather
than from statutory provisions or from treaties; second, the important
starting point is the extension of domestic venue law to the international
jurisdictional setting; and third, with an emphasis on the relation of the
defendant to the court and by rare consideration of the special circum-
stances of the individual case, the courts ensure that the principle of jus-
tice ultimately prevails in Japan's somewhat complicated and vague
jurisdictional law. 15 This general description applies equally to U.S. juris-
dictional law.
Of course, the Japanese law did evolve from the civil law, so in its
details it exhibits a heavier emphasis on fairness, and hence on general
jurisdiction at the defendant's domicile. 16 Japan, however, has made addi-
tional provision for specific jurisdiction in actions of tort, contract, and
property. 17 Note also that Japan has its exorbitant jurisdiction, having
inherited Germany's personal jurisdiction based on the attachment of
assets. 18
More recently, the Japanese law on jurisdiction has adopted some
aspects of the U.S. approach, 19 while the United States has increasingly
emphasized fairness. These developments demonstrate how different legal
systems tend toward convergence, given similar socio-economic influences.
When all is said and done, the Japanese law of today is not so different
from the U.S. law of international jurisdiction, at least if one ignores the
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction on both sides.
15. See Masato Dogauchi, Jurisdiction over Foreign Patent Infringement from a Japa-
nese Perspective in Consideration of the Hague Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters as of June 2001, 44 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 35
(2001). Compare Family Co. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHU 4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997), 41
JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 117 (1998) (special circumstances qualification), with Goto v. Malay-
sian Airline Syst Berhad, 35 MINSHU 1224 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 16, 1981), 26JAP. ANN. INT'L L.
122 (1983) (basic jurisdictional approach). See generally TAKAAxi HATrORI & DAN FENNO
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 4.07 (Yasuhei Taniguchi, Pauline C. Reich &
Hiroto Miyake eds., 2d ed. 2002); HIROsHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 447-48 (2d ed. 1999);
YASUNOBU SATO, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE PROCESSING AND JAPAN 179-81 (2001); John 0.
Haley, The Adjudicatory Jurisdiction of Japanese Courts in Transnational Litigation, in LAW
AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD 705 (James A. R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides
eds., 2002); Masatami Otsuka, Japan, in 2 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE JAP-1, JAP-8 to -12 (Richard H. Kreindler gen. ed., 1997).
16. See TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, supra note 15, § 4.05(2)-(3).
17. See id. § 4.05(4).
18. See MINOSHU [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], art. 5(iv), available in part at http://
www.japanlaw.co.jp/procedure/civilcode.html [hereinafter CCP]; TAKuAiI HATTORI &
DAN FENNO HENDERSON, supra note 15, § 4.0514][d]; ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 251 (2d ed. 2002).
19. See Dogauchi, supra note 15, at 6-7 (discussing Japan's stress on court-defen-
dant nexus, as opposed to the civil law's usual stress on court-claim nexus).
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2. Judgments20
Within one sovereign's boundaries, the sovereign can do pretty much
as it wishes. Its courts can reach as far as it pleases, and it then can enforce
the resulting judgment on the defendant if present or on any of the defen-
dant's assets present. In this sense, the sovereign's power is limitless. Of
course, the sovereign can choose to respect its own limits, whether
imposed by constitution or by self-restraint.
Outside the sovereign's boundaries, a sovereign's reach is limited. The
acts of a foreign government have no effect within another government's
territory, unless the latter government chooses to give them effect. The
second sovereign's court may choose not to respect the first sovereign's
judgment that is the product of overreaching. The task here, then, is to
specify what treatment a judgment will receive in a subsequent civil action
in another judicial system, and so to reveal these indirect restrictions on
U.S. jurisdiction.
a. Recognition and Enforcement
A court will recognize, or in other words give effect under the doctrine
of res judicata, to a nondomestic judgment that is valid and final. In the
U.S. view, when the second court faces the question of whether the prior
judgment is valid and final, it normally should apply the law of the judg-
ment rendering sovereign; when the second court faces a question of res
judicata based on the prior judgment, it normally should apply the law
that the rendering court would apply. The basic approach to judgments
thus is retroverse, in the sense of turning backward to look at the rendering
court's view of its own judgment: the second court lets the first court's law
decide what it conclusively adjudicated. 2 1
Furthermore, the second court will enforce a judgment entitled to rec-
ognition. However, with respect to the method of enforcement, the second
court applies its own law, subject to the proviso that the method should not
be so complex or expensive as to burden unduly the enforcement of
nondomestic judgments. A usual method of enforcement is for the plaintiff
to initiate in the second jurisdiction an action upon the prior judgment and
thus obtain a regularly enforceable domestic judgment.
The common issue tying into the above discussion of jurisdiction is
validity. The second court will respect only valid judgments. To be valid,
speaking generally of the U.S. view, the judgment rendering court must
have had territorial jurisdiction, as well as subject matter jurisdiction and
given adequate notice. The second court should not search for mere error,
such as violations of venue and other self-restraint provisions or even
errors of substantive law. It will, however, examine territorial jurisdiction.
20. See generally ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RESJUDCATA: A HANDBOOK
ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (2001).
21. See ALl INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT 37-44 (Discussion
Draft 2002); Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose
Law?, 70 IowA L. REV. 53, 54-55 (1984).
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It will deny effect to judgments that reflect jurisdictional overreach. Thus,
to some degree, the second court can restrict the effective territorial reach
of the rendering court. Accordingly, these restrictions are sometimes
called the law of indirect jurisdiction.
The above-described principles are obligatory on U.S. courts when the
judgment comes from another U.S. court. The obligation derives largely
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. But U.S.
courts treat judgments of foreign nations much like U.S. judgments. Their
respect flows from comity rather than from constitutional obligation. U.S.
courts give respect to foreign judgments not only because finality is a fair
and efficient policy, but also because U.S. courts hope to encourage similar
respect for their own judgments abroad. Thus, if the foreign sovereign that
rendered the judgment had subject matter and territorial jurisdiction and if
the circumstances of the adjudication were such that the parties can be
said to have had a fair day in court, the foreign res judicata law should be
applicable and the foreign judgment should be enforceable in the United
States.
The United States in fact behaves fairly generously in this regard, com-
pared to most other nations. Nevertheless, a closer look at the actual hold-
ings suggests that U.S. courts apply slightly different standards to
judgments of foreign nations, as compared to those applied to U.S. judg-
ments. The principal reason for the difference is that a U.S. court has no
guarantee that a foreign judgment, although comporting with the basic
requirements of the foreign nation, is minimally acceptable to Americans.
The foreign laws concerning validity vary widely. Moreover, the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not control foreign sovereigns, of course, and so the work-
ings of the foreign legal system could be rather, well, foreign. From this
insight follow four corollaries. First, a U.S. court will give no respect to a
foreign judgment that it views as repugnant. Thus, a U.S. court will not
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment resulting from proceedings that
failed to meet the basic notions of U.S. due process, including adequate
notice. Second, while a U.S. court can ask whether jurisdiction existed
under the foreign law, the U.S. court more importantly may examine
whether the foreign assertion of jurisdiction satisfied the American tests of
due process. For example, a U.S. court would disregard a French judgment
for which personal jurisdiction was based solely on the plaintiffs French
domicile. Third, a U.S. court might apply other limitations on comity,
such as refusing recognition or enforcement if the original claim is directly
contrary to strong local public policy. For a procedural example of those
limitations, a foreign default judgment rendered contrary to a forum selec-
tion clause's derogation might fall within the public policy exception.
Fourth, in principle but not in general practice, a U.S. court might require
reciprocity. 22
22. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113-14 (1895) (imposing reciprocity on federal
law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. f (1971) (amended 1988);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. d
(1987); cf. J. Noelle Hicks, Facilitating International Trade: The U.S. Needs Federal Legisla-
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International law itself plays no real role in U.S. treatment of foreign
judgments, except to the extent that the U.S. approach is already a manifes-
tation of any generally recognized principles that constitute part of interna-
tional law. The United States does not have a single treaty on the subject.
b. Res Judicata
Parties can invoke res judicata only outside the initial action, that is,
outside the first-instance process and any direct review such as appeal. So,
the usual discussion of res judicata contemplates the context of two
actions, presuming a first action (Action #1) that led to judgment and then
addressing that judgment's effect on a pending second action (Action #2),
which may have begun before or after Action #1. For example, the plaintiff
in Action #2 might invoke res judicata to preclude the defendant from
defending on the underlying merits in an action upon a judgment rendered
in Action # 1, or in some other action the plaintiff might invoke res judicata
to foreclose relitigation of certain issues decided in Action #1. Similarly,
the defendant in some subsequent action might invoke res judicata as a
defense by using a prior judgment to defeat a claim or preclude an issue.
So imagine an Action #1 for damages resulting in a valid and final
personal judgment, and then an Action #2 between the same parties.
What follows is the general scheme. 23
As to claim preclusion, if the plaintiff prevailed in Action #1, generally
his claim is extinguished by, or merged in, the judgment. He cannot main-
tain Action #2 on the same claim in an effort to win a more favorable judg-
ment. Similarly, if the plaintiff instead lost Action #1, generally his claim is
extinguished, or barred, by the judgment. If he brings Action #2 to try
again, the defendant may plead res judicata and thereby stop him in his
tracks. Thus, outside the context of the initial action, a party (or his privy)
may not relitigate a claim decided therein by a valid and final judgment,
subject to certain exceptions, of course. The claim is defined transaction-
ally, so as to include all rights arising out of the set of connected facts; the
judgment extinguishes the whole claim, precluding all matters within the
claim that were or could have been litigated in that initial action.
This doctrine of claim preclusion subdivides into merger and bar. On
the one hand, if the judgment in the initial action was in the plaintiff's
favor, the plaintiffs claim is said to merge in the judgment. The plaintiff
cannot bring a second action on the claim in the hope of winning a more
favorable judgment. However, the plaintiff can seek to enforce the judg-
ment, and the defendant cannot then raise defenses that were or could have
been interposed in that initial action. On the other hand, if the judgment
in the initial action was in the defendant's favor, the plaintiffs claim is said
tion Governing the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 155, 176-78
(2002) (arguing for legislation that would impose reciprocity in all circumstances).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982); Robert G. Bone, The
American Law of Preclusion: Legal Doctrine Under Policy Pressure (forthcoming in Jap-
anese) (English manuscript on file with author).
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to be barred by the judgment. The plaintiff cannot bring a second action
on the claim in the hope of winning this time.
Next, issue preclusion appears where exceptions to claim preclusion
exist. What happens if, by virtue of an exception, the plaintiff can main-
tain Action #2 on the same claim? Or what happens in the more likely
situation where the plaintiff and the defendant are involved in an Action #2
on a different claim, but a claim that involves some issues common to
Action #1? These situations present the question of the effect in Action #2
of decisions on issues in Action #1. Generally, any such decision is con-
clusive on the same issue in Action #2 if it was actually litigated and deter-
mined in Action #1 and if its determination was essential to the judgment
in Action #1. For example, if the judge in Action #1 found the plaintiff
negligent in causing an accident, the former defendant could use that find-
ing against him to preclude the issue's relitigation in Action #2, which was
brought by the former defendant for her own injuries in the accident.
Thus, outside the context of the initial action, regardless of which party
won judgment, a party (or his privy) may not relitigate any issue of fact or
law actually litigated and determined therein if the determination was
essential to a valid and final judgment, subject to many exceptions, of
course. Unlike claim preclusion, which reaches even matters that could
have been but were not litigated, issue preclusion reaches only matters that
were actually litigated and determined. And issue preclusion reaches only
essential determinations, not dicta or other asides.
This doctrine of issue preclusion subdivides into direct estoppel and
collateral estoppel. On the one hand, if the second action is on the same
claim as the initial action (the second action presumably falling within
some exception to claim preclusion), then the applicable variety of issue
preclusion is direct estoppel. On the other hand, if the second action is on
a different claim (which is much more common), then the applicable variety
of issue preclusion is collateral estoppel.
Now relax the assumption that the two actions involve the same par-
ties. A stranger to a prior judgment cannot be bound by it. However, the
stranger can benefit from it. The most important example of such benefit
is a stranger using a prior judgment for collateral estoppel against a former
party.
c. Comparison to Japanese Law
Again, some of this should sound familiar to Japanese ears. In Japan,
the Code of Civil Procedure (the "Code") provides for recognition and
enforcement of valid and final foreign judgments, provided that there was
jurisdiction and adequate notice, and provided that respecting the judg-
ment is not contrary to public policy or to reciprocity.2 4 The same descrip-
tion applies broadly to U.S. judgments law.2 5 It is noteworthy, however,
24. See CCP, supra note 18, art. 118; Minji shikko-ho [Civil execution law], Law No.
4 of 1979, art. 24; JOSEPH W.S. DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 345-52 (1996).
25. Again, of course, as one descends toward details, the differences increase. See
Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, 52 MINSHU 853 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 28, 1998), translated in 42 JAP.
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that Japan treats punitive damages as contrary to public policy. 26
Contrariwise, the U.S. law of res judicata is much broader than that of
Japan. The Japanese law comprises a narrow form of claim preclusion
applicable only to claims actually asserted and contains no true issue pre-
clusion. 27 Accordingly, Japan would tend to apply its own res judicata law
to foreign judgments.28 That is, although the United States applies Japa-
nese res judicata law to Japanese judgments, Japan would apply Japanese
res judicata law to U.S. judgments. Instead of seeing a difference here, one
could argue that both countries adhere to the reasonable principle of apply-
ing the less extensive res judicata law to foreign judgments.
B. U.S. Views of the Draft Hague Convention 2 9
To understand the U.S. position, one must first look to European
developments. The principal European countries now appear ahead of the
United States on the treatment of foreign judgments. The European Union
has an enlightened, albeit far from perfect, treaty dating from 1968. That
treaty is the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, which morphed into a Euro-
ANN. INT'L L. 155 (1999) (requiring foreign judgments also to satisfy Japanese jurisdic-
tion law); Takonobu Takehara, Japan, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLD-
WIDE 54, 58-59 (Charles Platto & William G. Horton eds., 2d ed. 1993) (saying that the
Japanese view of finality applies as well, including the requirement that the time to
appeal has expired). See generally ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD 142 (Ronald A. Brand ed., 1992); Samuel Jarman,
Japan, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 263 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1997); Takao
Sawaki, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Japan, 23 INT'L LAW. 29
(1989); Morio Takeshita, The Recognition of Foreign Judgments by the Japanese Courts, 39
JAI. ANN. INT'L L. 55 (1996); Masayuki Yoshida & Nobuyuki Taji, Japan, in ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS Japan-I (Louis Garb & Julian Lew eds., 2001).
26. See Northcon I v. Mansei Kogyo Co., 51 MINSHU 2573 (Sup. Ct., July 11, 1997),
translated in 41 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 104 (1998); Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and
Enforcement of Common Law Punitive Damages in a Civil Law System: Some Reflections on
the Japanese Experience, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 285 (1999); see also Takeshita, supra
note 25, at 67-69; cf. id. at 74 ("Noticeably, most non-recognition cases are concerned
with judgments emanating from the United States. This seems to reflect the differences
in thinking between the two countries with regard to matters such as jurisdictional
basis, service abroad, damages, and custody.").
27. See CCP, supra note 18, arts. 114-15; Casad, supra note 21, at 66-67; cf. RAM-
SEYER & NAKA ATO, supra note 1, at 144-45 (attributing the narrowness of Japanese
preclusion law to the low cost of proving anew in a system that relies on documentary
evidence and operates without juries).
28. See HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 15, § 14.03(1)(a) (predicting, in the
absence of precedent, this narrow construction of CCP, supra note 18, art. 118). It is
worth noting that some countries, such as Germany, talk of applying the rendering sov-
ereign's more expansive res judicata law, but it seems doubtful that they would actually
do so when it made a real difference. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1601, 1681 n.275 (1968).
29. See generally Kevin M. Clermont, An Introduction to the Hague Convention, in A
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 3 (JohnJ. Barcel6
Ill & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002).
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pean Union Regulation on March 1, 2002.30
By the Brussels Convention, the member states agreed to provide vir-
tually automatic recognition and enforcement of the judgments of the other
member states. This provision was like the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. In order to make this judgments agreement accept-
able, the Brussels Convention was a "double convention" that also defined
the bases of jurisdiction-the doctrine that must, in any judgment respect-
ing regime, serve almost alone in ensuring adjudicative restraint. The
European member states could give respect to the others' judgments
because they knew that the Brussels Convention restricted the others to
appropriate jurisdictional reach. This latter restriction worked as the Due
Process Clause does in the United States.
Today, the EU Regulation's jurisdictional bases follow the civil law
approach. The defendant's domicile is the usual place for suit, although
there is additionally long-arm-like jurisdiction for tort and contract actions.
Certain disadvantaged plaintiffs, such as consumers, can often sue at
home. Moreover, there is authorization for forum selection agreements,
and there is exclusive local jurisdiction in actions concerning real property
and the like.
Further on the prohibited side, each member state gave up its exorbi-
tant jurisdiction. France, for example, gave up its personal jurisdiction
based on the plaintiffs French nationality. Similarly, England gave up
transient jurisdiction and attachment jurisdiction. Additionally, the Brus-
sels Regulation not only prohibits exorbitant jurisdiction, but also makes
mandatory the permissible bases of jurisdiction. So, England abandoned
its judicial practice of sometimes declining jurisdiction on expressly dis-
cretionary grounds.
Europe does not appear superior in all regards, however. Note that the
Brussels Regulation applies only to defendants domiciled in a member
state. Indeed, the Brussels Regulation openly discriminates against outsid-
ers. Accordingly, although France cannot use its exorbitant jurisdiction in
a suit by a French domiciliary against an English person, it can still use it
when the defendant is an American. Moreover, the resulting French judg-
ment gets recognition and enforcement in England, Germany, and else-
where in the European Union against the American or the American's
assets there. Admittedly, this example is extreme, without much impor-
tance in actual practice, but illustrates the theoretical context.
Similarly, the virtually automatic recognition and enforcement under
the Brussels Regulation does not extend to judgments rendered by coun-
tries that are not member states. The European countries, in fact, have
traditionally been and continue to be rather stingy in extending respect to
foreign judgments not covered by treaty, such as U.S. judgments.
In short, Americans are being whipsawed by the European approach.
Not only are they still subject (in theory) to the far-reaching jurisdiction of
30. No. 44/2001, 2001 OJ. (L 12) 1. There is also the related Lugano Convention,
which extended the Brussels Convention to the EFTA countries.
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European courts and the wide recognition and enforceability of the result-
ing European judgments, but also U.S. judgments tend (in practice) to
receive short shrift in European courts.
The overall international situation, as exacerbated by the Brussels Reg-
ulation, is untenable in the long run for the United States. Therefore, in
1992, the United States initiated a push to conclude a worldwide conven-
tion on jurisdiction and judgments, having naturally chosen to work
through the Hague Conference on Private International Law. A convention
would resolve the whipsawing predicament in which Americans today find
themselves regarding exercise of jurisdiction, as well as recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
Drafting and agreeing on a multilateral convention thus could yield
great returns for the United States on both jurisdiction law and judgments
law. A convention would rationalize the law on an international level. In
the specific matter of treatment of foreign judgments, a convention would
unarguably be desirable for the United States. It would mean that the
United States could get returns for the respect it already accords other
nations' judgments. As to the jurisdictional side, a convention would cause
other nations to renounce their own exorbitant jurisdiction. It could also
substantively improve U.S. jurisdiction law in international cases.
Will such a convention come into existence, as opposed to a narrow
convention treating special problem areas such as exclusive choice-of-court
agreements in business-to-business contracts? 3 ' As negotiations enter their
final phase, the possibility still persists that a multilateral convention of
general scope will emerge for signature, ratification, and implementation.
But the possibility now appears slim. And the United States has little bar-
gaining power. It needs a convention, while the Europeans have little to
gain over their presently favorable situation. The Europeans have exhibited
some fixed positions and bloc voting. The negotiations have indeed often
degenerated into disputes between Americans and Europeans, leaving
other countries' delegates on the sidelines.
31. For the latest suggestion of the content of an eventual convention, see the Hague
Conference on Private International Law's website, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/
workprog/jdgm.html. For a balanced evaluation of the current stalemate, see Samuel P.
Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments:
Where We Are and the Road Ahead, 4 EUR. J.L. REFORM 219 (2002). One key to under-
standing the draft Hague Convention is the notion of a "mixed convention," as distin-
guished from a-double convention. The United States has pushed a mixed convention
from the beginning as a way to bridge the negotiators' wide differences on jurisdictional
approaches. This mixed convention includes not only a so-called whitelist of requiredjurisdictional bases and a so-called blacklist of prohibited bases, like a double conven-
tion, but also a catch-all gray zone of permitted bases. In the gray zone, a signatory
country could exercise jurisdiction on any basis under its own law not on the blacklist
or whitelist, but other countries would not have to recognize or enforce the resultingjudgment. Although such a mixed convention does not go as far in providing global
uniformity as a double convention, its more limited ambition greatly facilitates interna-
tional agreement. It also provides a means to handle jurisdiction in areas where diver-
sity of practice is beneficial at present or where significant changes are foreseeable in the
near future.
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Because of this imbalance of power, the expectation is that any even-
tual convention of general scope would be very similar to the EU Regula-
tion. This eventuality means that the United States would abandon-on
the international level, but not necessarily with respect to its courts'
actions against its own habitual residents-attachment jurisdiction, 32 tran-
sient jurisdiction,3 3 doing business as a basis for general jurisdiction, 34
and much of forum non conveniens. The Europeans' objection is to the
U.S. proclivity to base general jurisdiction on rather thin contacts, namely,
allowing any and all causes of action to be brought on the basis of the
defendant's property ownership, physical presence, or doing business in
the forum. They do not object to specific jurisdiction, as long as a rules-
based approach controls its mandatory application. Thus, jurisdiction
under a Hague Convention would exist at the unconsenting defendant's
habitual residence or where a specific part of the events in suit occurred,
but would not extend to the broader bases of jurisdiction now authorized
by U.S. law. In sum, the Hague Convention would agree on certain bases
of territorial jurisdiction, but chiefly those palatable to the Europeans-
and judgments based thereon would receive virtually automatic recogni-
tion and enforcement in other signatory countries (except those judgments
that the Europeans consider too generous or punitive).
Such a prospect is not to the United States' liking.3 5 In the end, per-
haps the United States would have to pay too great a price for securing
agreement to a Hague Convention. Or perhaps the document emerging
from the intermittent and contentious drafting sessions would be too
imperfect. Some of its current provisions remain maddeningly awkward or
vague. Until recently, generalist drafters had not treated technical matters,
such as intellectual property very well. Also, their lack of foresight has thus
far prevented the crafting of handles on future developments, such as e-
commerce.
Reaching agreement on a Hague Convention is therefore far from a
certainty. The only thing certain is that the final segment of the path to
international agreement will not be smooth. Regardless of the ultimate out-
come, however, the fruits of negotiation have definitely been worth the
effort. Merely negotiating the draft Hague Convention has taught all sides
a lot about jurisdiction and judgments. In particular, it has given the
United States the opportunity to untangle its law in domestic cases on its
own.
3 6
32. See Feder v. Turkish Airlines, 441 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
33. See supra text accompanying note 7.
34. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
35. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and
the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can the Hague Conference Project
Succeed?, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE,
supra note 29, at 281; Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private
Int'l Law, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conf. on
Private Int'l Law (Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with author).
36. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 89 (1999); Kevin M. Clermont & Kuo-Chang Huang, Converting the Draft Hague
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II. Japanese Approach
A. Representative Japanese View of the Draft Hague Convention
I take as representative, albeit at times lonely, the written views of
Professor Masato Dogauchi of the University of Tokyo, who is an official
delegate to the Hague Conference. 3 7 His bottom line on the draft Hague
Convention is very positive. He views globalization and interdependence
as creating the need for a convention and finds that the draft would make
for a "more predictable and more stable legal order on the earth. '38
Indeed, he reports that "the Japanese government seems very positive
towards the Hague Project."'3 9
Professor Dogauchi observes that Japan is well-positioned between
civil law and common law countries on the subject of jurisdiction, so that
it can accommodate the demands of both. This flexible posture means,
among other things, that Japan has supported the United States' idea of a
mixed convention all along.40
Of course, Professor Dogauchi has some concerns about the draft
Convention. He makes some good points about the scope of its coverage
and the requirements for service of process. But his leading concerns are
jurisdictional.
Among others, in the United States, [although] a trend to limit its scope of
jurisdiction can be noticed, there are still huge risks for Japanese parties to
be summoned in the United States courts to defend [claims unrelated to]
their activities in.the country (doing business as the basis for general juris-
diction). The service of a writ upon the defendant is also a potential risk for
the Japanese parties who attend conferences or meetings in the United
States.4
1
He is absolutely correct here. The United States should give up its exorbi-
tant jurisdiction in exchange for Japan doing the same.
Article 18 of the draft Convention would eliminate transient jurisdic-
tion as a basis of general jurisdiction. This basis has long enjoyed judicial
approval in the United States and thus is constitutional, provided its appli-
cation is not so outlandish that it is unreasonable in the particular circum-
Treaty into Domestic Jurisdictional Law, in A GLOBAL LAW OFJURISDICTION ANDJUDGMENTS:
LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE, supra note 29, at 191.
37. Dogauchi, supra note 15.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id.
40. See Comments by the Japanese Government on Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conf. Prelim.
Doc. No. 14, at 3-4 (Apr. 2001), available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-pdl4jp.doc;
Masato Dogauchi, Jurisdiction over Foreign Patent Infringement from a Japanese Perspec-
tive in Consideration of the Hague Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters as of June 2001, 44JAr. ANN. INT'L L. 35, 39-41 (2001);
supra note 31 (defining mixed convention).
41. Dogauchi, supra note 15, at 11; see Dogauchi, supra note 40, at 42 n.20 (saying
that doing-business jurisdiction is considered exorbitant everywhere but in the United
States and that elimination of that jurisdiction is a key to the success of the Hague
Convention).
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stances.4 2 However, it has also long been the recipient of criticism, from
academics and foreigners alike.4 3 Formerly the most important basis of
U.S. jurisdiction, it is today far from essential. It is occasionally used to
sue foreigners in the United States, even though the resulting judgment
would be unlikely to receive recognition or enforcement abroad. 44 Indeed,
courts use transient jurisdiction, albeit inappropriately, only when all
appropriate bases of jurisdiction are unavailing. Given transient jurisdic-
tion's dubious propriety and general lack of necessity, the United States
should accept the draft Convention's prohibition, and it appears willing to
do so.4 5
Much more controversial is Article 18's elimination of doing business
as a basis of general jurisdiction, other than at an organization's principal
place of business activity. Under the doing-business doctrine, if at the time
of service of process the defendant's business activities in the forum state
are extensively continuous and systematic, then the defendant becomes
subject to jurisdiction even on claims that are wholly unrelated to the in-
state activities. 4 6 For reasons difficult to fathom, some objective persons in
the United States maintain allegiance to this doctrine. 4 7 However, general
42. See Sarieddine v. Moussa, 820 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (implicitly
rejecting the minority opinion of Justice Scalia in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S.
604, 619 (1990), which suggested that transient jurisdiction merely by its historical
pedigree always satisfies the unreasonableness test); LAWRENCE W. NEWMAN & MICHAEL
BURROWS, THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 1-115 to -121 (2d ed. 1998); supra
text accompanying note 7 (defining transient jurisdiction).
43. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
121-23 (3d ed. 1996); MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE 78
(1995) (explaining that most Western European countries do not utilize transient juris-
diction); Stephen B. Burbank, The United States' Approach to International Civil Litiga-
tion: Recent Developments in Forum Selection, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 13-14, 18
(1998); Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: Critical
Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593,
599-601; RussellJ. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 611, 613-16 (1991); Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law
in the Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REX'. 1283, 1296-97 (1998)
(explaining that transient jurisdiction conflicts with international standards).
44. See DAVID EPSTEIN, JEFFREY L. SNYDER & CHARLES S. BALDWIN, IV, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND STRATEGY § 6.04[31 (3d ed. 2002);
LouISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION § 1-6, at 50-52 (1996).
45. See RussellJ. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition
Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167,
189-90 (1998); Russell J. Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judg-
ments Convention, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1269, 1278-79 (1998).
46. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (allowing Mississippi to
exercise general jurisdiction over a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Illinois, for a Pennsylvania accident); supra Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) (discussing doing-business jurisdiction).
47. See Al INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS PROJECT 13-15 (Report
2000) (describing this dispute as a possible deal breaker); Linda J. Silberman, Can the
Hague Judgments Project Be Saved?: A Perspectivefrom the United States, in A GLOBAL LAW
OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE, supra note 29, at 159, 175-79
(suggesting a compromise); cf. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-
Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 (suggesting eliminating entirely this
basis against foreign defendants).
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jurisdiction based on doing business, which is indeed peculiar to the
United States,48 entails terrible problems of line-drawing and does not con-
form to the usual rationale of general jurisdiction. 49 Because it requires
the defendant to be so active in the forum as to seem a native, it is seldom
available under its own terms.5 0 This basis of jurisdiction arose to provide
appropriate jurisdiction when specific jurisdiction was not yet fully availa-
ble. Today, courts resort to it, albeit inappropriately, only when all appro-
priate bases of personal jurisdiction fail to reach the defendant.5 1 Given
the shortcomings of the doing-business jurisdiction, the draft Convention
in Article 18 properly abandons this basis of general jurisdiction. But of
course, the more common activity-based jurisdiction that falls more solidly
within specific jurisdiction would survive under the draft Convention.
Professor Dogauchi does not list concerns with punitive damages or
res judicata, the two other areas of greatest difference between the U.S. and
Japanese law discussed above. But he is well-advised not to worry about
these, because under the draft Convention neither would present great dan-
gers to Japanese interests. First, its Article 33 would relieve Japan of the
obligation to recognize the part of a judgment for punitive damages. Sec-
ond, although currently its Article 25 chooses the rendering law to govern
finality of a foreign judgment, 52 it remains marvelously obscure on the
choice of law governing res judicata, leaving Japan free to apply its own
narrow res judicata law.5 3
B. Representative U.S. View of Japanese Law
Of the five major casebooks on international litigation used in the
48. See REIMANN, supra note 43, at 77, 82-83. But see Silberman, supra note 47, at
176-77 (reading Goto v. Malaysian Airline System Berhad, 35 MINSHU 1224 (Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 16, 1981), 26 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 122 (1983), as creating doing-business
jurisdiction).
49. See BORN, supra note 43, at 103-16.
50. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984)(holding that "mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to
warrant a State's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in
a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions"). But see RUSSELL J. WEIN-
TRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 6 (3d ed. 2001) (citing questionable
counterexamples).
51. E.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967); see Rus-
sell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention
and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 187-89 (1998)
(explaining that elimination of doing-business jurisdiction "will block suit in only a few
cases in which the United States has a legitimate interest in providing a forum").
52. The Japanese Government has objected to this provision. See Comments by the
Japanese Government on Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 40, at 11-12.
53. Article 25(1) provides simply that a judgment on a proper basis of jurisdiction
"shall be recognised or enforced." But see Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, Report of the Spe-
cial Commission, Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 11, at 96 (2000) (assuming that the
rendering law would govern res judicata: "Recognition is given to a judgment 'when it is
given the same effect that it has in the state where it was rendered .... .' (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 2 introductory note (1971))),
available at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgmpd I1doc.
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United States, 5 4 only one uses a Japanese case as a teaching case on juris-
diction and judgments. 55 The case is Marubeni America Corp. v. Kabushiki
Kaisha Kansai Tekk sho.56 However, taking into account the occasionally
incensed reactions of my Japanese students and the pertinent law review
commentary,5 7 I do not take this case to be fully representative of Japanese
law. Nevertheless, the particulars of that case merit consideration.
In 1968, Jerry Deutsch, an employee of the Boeing Company in Wash-
ington State, mangled his hand in a large mechanical press. Boeing had
bought the press from West Coast Machinery Co. (a Washington corpora-
tion), which had bought it from Marubeni America (a New York subsidiary
corporation), which had bought it from Marubeni Japan (a Japanese parent
corporation), which had bought it from the manufacturer Kansai Iron
Works (a Japanese corporation in Osaka). Deutsch sued West Coast and
Marubeni America in a state court of Washington, alleging a defective press
and requesting $275,000. By service in Japan, Marubeni America
impleaded Kansai, which attacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of
Washington upheld jurisdictional power on the ground that Kansai had
transacted business in Washington by building the press to Boeing's exten-
sive specifications, by sending to Washington its engineers to test and
inspect the press and to oversee repairs, and by sending replacement parts
to Washington. Moreover, the court found the exercise of jurisdiction not
to be unreasonable in view of Kansai's other extensive business in the
United States, the burden on Marubeni America, and the location of evi-
dence. 58 On September 17, 1974, the trial court awarded Marubeni
America a judgment against Kansai for $86,000.
Meanwhile, Kansai was not asleep in Japan. It sued Marubeni America
54. BORN, supra note 43; LOWENFELD, supra note 18; JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZ-
PATRICK & JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. (2000);
RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION (2002); WEINTRAUB, supra note 50.
55. LOWENFELD, supra note 18, at 176-83; see also id. at 277-78 (treating failure of
lis pendens in Miyakoshi Mach. Tools Co. v. Gould, Inc., 1348 HANREIJIHO 91 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., May 30, 1989)). However, WEINTRAUB, supra note 50, at 15-16, does briefly describe
three jurisdiction cases, Goto v. Malaysian Airline System Berhad, 35 MINSHU 1224 (Sup.
Ct., Oct. 16, 1981), 26 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 122 (1983); Family Co. v. Miyahara, 51 MINSHU
4055 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 11, 1997), 41 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 117 (1998); and Mukoda v. Boeing
Co. (Far Eastern Air Transport Case), 604 HANREI TAIMUZU 138 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 20,
1986), 31 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 216 (1988).
56. 361 HANREI TAIMUZU 127 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Dec. 22, 1977). This case also
receives a brief description in BORN, supra note 43, at 489, to support his conclusion:
"Japanese courts apparently refuse to enforce U.S. judgments that are inconsistent with
subsequently-entered Japanese judgments."
57. See Takao Sawaki, Battle of Lawsuits: Lis Pendens in International Relations, 23
JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 17, 28 & n.25 (1979-1980) (criticizing this case at length); Takeshita,
supra note 25, at 71 & n.16 ("The judgment of the Osaka District Court seems to be
strongly in favor of a Japanese judgment in the sense that a foreign judgment may be
rejected even if it was finally and conclusively given before the relevant Japanese judg-
ment .... Giving priority to a Japanese judgment in such a way as the Osaka District
Court ruled would excessively jeopardize the international harmony of decisions .... In
addition, that solution is inconsistent with the principle of res judicata.").
58. Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 497 P.2d 1311 (Wash. 1972).
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in the Osaka District Court to declare nonliability for indemnification. 5 9
Finding jurisdiction, the Japanese court followed precedent to reject the
defense that this proceeding was a prohibited "double action," so constru-
ing the word "court" in the Code's prohibition to mean that the prior action
had to be pending in a Japanese court.60 Later, on October 14, 1974
(when there was still time to appeal the U.S. judgment), the court ruled
that Marubeni America had no right to indemnity under Japanese contract
or tort law.
Next, Marubeni America sued Kansai on its Washington judgment in
that same Japanese court. In 1977, the court rejected that claim, denying
recognition on the ground that the Washington judgment was inconsistent
with a Japanese judgment (its own 1974 judgment) and hence was con-
trary to the public policy of Japan. 6 1
In the U.S. view, the Japanese court in 1974 should probably have
given res judicata effect to the Washington judgment, which was valid and
final under Washington law. By any view, this ten-year battle of lawsuits is
not a pretty picture.
III. Specific Problem: Parallel Actions
The way to beautify this picture of battling international lawsuits is
through a sensible scheme of lis pendens.62 Here, too, the United States
and Japan are not really that far apart in practice.6 3
A. U.S. Law
The pendency of a lawsuit in one court is normally no impediment to
bringing a related suit in a different court. Although the first suit to go tojudgment should be res judicata in the other, the pendency of otherwise
parallel proceedings is a commonplace with no ready cure.
A minor doctrine of some relevance is the affirmative defense called
other action pending, or prior pending action.64 It tries to stop repetitive
litigation in its tracks, well before any troublesome rendition of judgment.
Although this approach seems a sensible way to reduce repetitive litigation,
the defense is only narrowly applicable. It will result in dismissal without
prejudice if another action on the same claim between the same parties is
59. See DAvis, supra note 24, at 349-50 (describing this common move "as a tactic to
thwart the recognition of foreign judgments").
60. See CCP, supra note 18, art. 142 ("No party shall file a suit concerning a matter
presently pending before a court."); TAKAAi HATTORi & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, supra
note 15, § 4.06[6].
61. See CCP, supra note 18, art. 118(iii); TAKAAKI HATrORi & DAN FENNO HENDERSON,
supra note 15, § 14.03[11][a] & n.260.
62. Accord, Sawaki, supra note 57, at 20-21 (arguing for a lis pendens solution, to be
achieved by applying the Code's double-action prohibition to any foreign litigation that
would produce res judicata effects in Japan); see ODA, supra note 15, at 448-49.
63. See Yoshimasa Furuta, International Parallel Litigation: Disposition of Duplicative
Civil Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 42 (1995)(describing similar premises and many comparable doctrines).
64. See 1 C.J.S. ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL §§ 16-84 (1985).
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pending in the same state, or in the same federal district, when the instant
action was commenced and if that other action is still pending. Thus, its
very limited scope of application serves powerfully to underscore that the
usual approach is to allow a second court to proceed toward judgment
despite earlier instituted litigation.
Besides the doctrine of other action pending, other inroads on the
usual approach exist, but they too are minor. One court, usually the first
to acquire jurisdiction, might enjoin proceedings in the other court. Alter-
natively, one court, usually the second, might stay its own hand in defer-
ence to the other court. A little more detail on these two approaches is
appropriate. 65
An antisuit injunction by one court against proceedings in another
court within the United States is generally prohibited, or at least will be
discretionarily refused. On the international level, however, some U.S.
courts are slightly more willing to enjoin a party subject to its personal
jurisdiction from participating in specified foreign proceedings, equitably
balancing interests but still weighting the balance against interference.
Under the vague doctrine called lis pendens, one court may stay its
own proceedings in deference to the other's related proceedings, if the
other related proceedings are in a more appropriate forum. This discretion-
ary power has been judicially created as an incident to the courts' inherent
power to control their own dockets. But here, too, the U.S. case law is split,
as precedent either emphasizes the court's obligation to proceed with the
case by narrowly limiting the court's power to stay its proceedings or gives
the court considerable discretion to decide on an all-things-considered
basis whether to stay its proceedings. When a court so stays itself, it exer-
cises self-restraint with respect to its territorial authority to adjudicate.
Indeed, this doctrine is very similar to forum non conveniens, albeit a bit
more readily invoked, the differences being that this doctrine requires a
pending alternative and that stayed proceedings are more easily revived if
necessary than dismissed proceedings.
B. Japanese Law
Similarly, Japan has a Code prohibition of double actions that has
only domestic application. 66 The treatment of the international problem of
parallel actions instead still rests on the vague but limited court-made doc-
trine of lis pendens, despite some failed efforts to codify a solution in the
1996 reform of civil procedure.67
65. See BORN, supra note 43, at 461-90; LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 369-72 (2d ed. 2000); James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
769 (1999); Edward Dumbauld, Judicial Interference with Litigation in Other Courts, 74
DICK. L. REV. 369, at 777-81 (1970).
66. See CCP, supra note 18, art. 142.
67. See DAvis, supra note 24, at 472-74; SATO, supra note 15, at 181-82; Masato
Dogauchi, Japan, in J.J. FAWCETT, DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
303 (1995); Furuta, supra note 63, at 25-39; Hideyuki Kobayashi & Yoshimasa Furuta,
Products Liability Act and Transnational Litigation in Japan, 34 TEX. INT'L LJ. 93, 108-13
(1999).
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Sometimes, the court will dismiss the Japanese action for lack of juris-
diction when actually motivated in part by the pendency of the foreign
action. Rarely, the court will expressly consider dismissal under the so-
called German method, where the foreign action is expected with reasona-
ble certainty to produce a judgment recognizable in Japan. 68
However, this doctrine of lis pendens goes unsupplemented by any
statutory or case authority for antisuit injunctions. 6 9 Moreover, Japanese
courts lack legal authority to openly stay their proceedings or to condition
their dismissals.70
C. Reconciliation
The draft Hague Convention confronts some of these difficulties in
Article 21. In order to avoid parallel proceedings and to foster comity, its
"first-seised rule" provides that the court where the action is first initiated
should proceed to adjudicate the dispute, while the court where an action
on the same cause is later brought should stay its proceedings. Because
under the rest of the draft the courts' jurisdictional reach is shortened and
so the plaintiffs' available forums are restricted, the advantage given to the
first-suing plaintiff by the first-seised rule becomes acceptably modest. 71
Nevertheless, further improvement is possible in the treatment of
related actions.7 2 Imagine that the United States and Japan were to try to
agree on a solution to the problem of battling lawsuits, and assume that
they had otherwise agreed on jurisdictional rules. Here is the provision
that I would suggest to them:73
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a court of a state having jurisdic-
tion in an action must stay the proceedings, or the related part thereof, if
when the action commenced a related action was pending in another con-
tracting state and:
68. See Dogauchi, supra note 67, at 310-16.
69. See id. at 318 (making a theoretical argument for the existence of the power to
enjoin).
70. See id. at 310, 314.
71. For criticism of this rule's inducing a race to the courthouse, see Catherine Kes-
sedjian, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Hague Conf. Prelim. Doc. No. 7, at 86 (1997). Of course, in the absence of this rule,
there is a similarly undesirable race to judgment. See George A. Bermann, The Use of
Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 602 n.58
(1990). On balance, the direction of the draft Hague Convention's rule is desirable. See
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention, and Pro-
gress in National Law, in A GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM
THE HAGUE, supra note 29, at 117; Martine Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non
Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949 (2001). But cf. Furuta,
supra note 63, at 44-50, 54-55 (preferring for general application a markedly more
flexible approach).
72. For a thoughtful extension of the subject under consideration from strictly paral-
lel proceedings to the more general problem of merely related actions, viewed from both
the common law and civil law perspectives, see Samuel P. Baumgartner, Related Actions,
3 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ZIVILPROZESS INTERNATIONAL 203 (1998).
73. See Clermont & Huang, supra note 36, at 226-28 (drafting this suggestion for
the domestic context).
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(1) the current proceedings present a claim asserted in that pending action;
or
(2) the current proceedings present a claim that would be a compulsory
counterclaim in that pending action.
(b) The second-seised court may refuse to stay, or may lift a stay, if in the
first-commenced action:
(1) the plaintiff is seeking only a declaration of nonliability;
(2) the plaintiff fails to prosecute its case;
(3) a judgment would not be rendered within a reasonable time; or
(4) a judgment would not be recognized in the second-seised state.
(c) Otherwise, a court of a state having jurisdiction in an action may stay
the proceedings, or the related part thereof, if a related action is pending in
another contracting state and the actions are so closely connected that it is
expedient to hear and determine them together.
(d) The court must resume or dismiss the stayed proceedings promptly after
the other action terminates.
(e) A court of a state may not issue an antisuit injunction to forbid a person
from bringing a claim in the court of another contracting state on the
ground that the other court is an inappropriate location for suit.
By way of brief explanation, subsection (a) would significantly change
the traditional U.S. doctrine, by adopting the rule that the second-seised
court normally has to stay its proceedings. 74 Two policies then compete
regarding the appropriate scope of exceptions to this obligation. On the
one hand, in order to prevent the second court from overly protecting its
own citizens, exceptions should be narrowly defined and also the court
should not be given much discretion to refuse to stay proceedings. On the
other hand, it is essential to avoid dictating the inappropriate staying of
proceedings. Thus, the four enumerated exceptions in subsection (b) gen-
erally follow the draft Hague Convention's approach, which strikes a bal-
ance in the middle.
The rest of the proposal gives the court discretion to stay its own pro-
ceedings, thus changing traditional Japanese doctrine. 75 It also expressly
prohibits antisuit injunctions as being undesirable. Because the proposal
binds courts to resolve the problems of parallel proceedings by lis pendens,
and because agreed restraints on the courts' jurisdictional reach are
assumed to exist, there would no longer be a need for permitting a court to
issue an antisuit injunction. Two reasons for an antisuit injunction are the
desire to avoid the burden of duplicate proceedings that could result in
inconsistent judgments and the need to protect the issuing forum's juris-
diction or public policy. The former concern would be handled by a gen-
eral rule requiring the second-seised court to stay its proceedings, and the
latter concern would be alleviated by a reasonable distribution of jurisdic-
tion among the states.
Naturally, in the unregulated context of international forum competi-
tion, when the foreign forum is not bound by agreed jurisdictional rules,
the justification vanishes for a first-seised rule and for prohibiting antisuit
74. See supra note 71.
75. See Furuta, supra note 63, at 50-56 (suggesting statutory introduction of stays).
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injunctions. So, the ordinary case law of the United States and Japan
would remain in force toward the rest of the world.
IV. General Resolution: Bilateral Treaty
The current outlook for a multilateral convention of general scope is
bleak, as already suggested. 76 That is a sad development. Harmonization
of procedural systems is never easy, but it holds great promise in certain
areas such as judicial cooperation across borders. 77 Currently at The
Hague, thoughts are turning toward significantly narrowing the draft's
scope, salvaging something from all the good work performed over the last
decade but treating only special problem areas such as exclusive choice-of-
court agreements in business-to-business contracts.
Important to remember is that the Brussels Convention emerged in a
region that had a long history of experimentation with bilateral and then
multilateral treaties on judgments and later on jurisdiction.7 8 The United
States was perhaps being unrealistic in jumping head-first into multilateral
negotiations on broad and difficult issues with expectations of quick suc-
cess. Perhaps the United States should instead have taken some smaller
first steps before trying to run.
So the Hague negotiators may be wise in now cutting back the scope
of their project. But I believe that an additional or alternative solution,
once the Hague negotiators have amicably decided not to pursue a multilat-
eral convention of general scope, would be for like-minded countries to
pursue regional or bilateral treaties that utilize the lessons learned at The
Hague. Regional treaties would be preferable theoretically, but bilateral
treaties are so much more feasible. The Hague negotiations on jurisdiction
and judgments have demonstrated how this problem that is polycentric
even on the bilateral level becomes much more diffuse through multilateral
discussion. Instead, two socio-economically similar countries, not too far
apart legally at the beginning and determined to succeed in agreeing at the
end, present the greatest promise.
In the context of bilateral negotiations, vague problems and dangers
become easier to conceptualize and then to resolve or avoid. Having only
one other legal system to investigate and accommodate is much easier.
Moreover, the objections of domestic interest groups become less acute.
The drafters for two advanced countries could more readily satisfy the con-
cerns of the intellectual property bar and human rights activists, for two
examples, whose concerns escalate when facing the range of fears gener-
ated by a worldwide convention that would encompass all sorts of societies
and laws.
76. See supra text accompanying note 31.
77. See Kevin M. Clermont, Foreword: Why Comparative Civil Procedure?, in KuO-
CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO THE CIVIL LAW 1 (2003).
78. See SAMUEL PETER BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDIC-
TION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 55-67 (2003).
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Consider a treaty between the United States and Japan. Among many
legal similarities between the two, neither country, despite its felt needs for
such an agreement, has any general treaty on jurisdiction and judgments.
The closest the United States came was in the 1970's, when it negotiated a
bilateral judgments treaty with the United Kingdom. 79 That effort ulti-
mately failed because of British fears of the reach of U.S. jurisdiction and
the size and punitive nature of U.S. judgments.8 0 Today, the United King-
dom is part of the European Union, putting that traditional treaty party of
the United States out of bounds. Japan then becomes the logical successor
as partner.
The United States and Japan are both major players, with lots in com-
mon. Their relevant laws are very similar. As to their legal differences,
Japan would obviously have the same fears of overreaching jurisdiction
and huge judgments as the British had years ago, and as the Europeans
have voiced more recently at The Hague. But times have changed. The
Hague negotiations have produced a readily adoptable blacklist that pro-
hibits certain jurisdictional bases,8 1 as well as producing a punitive-dam-
ages limitation,8 2 to assuage those fears.
Now, the United States is obviously in a balking mood, especially
when it confronts a European-like bargaining position on jurisdiction and
judgments. But the Japanese have acted somewhat more flexibly in the
Hague negotiations. 83 They would like to put limits on U.S. excesses. In
exchange, the United States could get more respect for its judgments than
Japan has traditionally afforded.8 4 Thus a deal seems doable, one that
would give both the United States and Japan something valuable at reason-
able cost-especially because a mixed-convention's form can put some of
the more contentious or undeveloped issues aside.
With relatively small need for great compromise on other matters, as
demonstrated in the above exercise concerning parallel proceedings, Japan
and the United States could convert the draft Hague Convention into a
bilateral treaty much to the taste and advantage of both countries. This
treaty between two major and interconnected countries would have many
direct benefits, including smoothing their relationship, imposing restraint
and certainty on their mutual laws, and providing to their citizens justice
without regard to the countries' borders. The attendant costs, such as dis-
ruption in the countries' uniform approach to foreign countries in interna-
tional litigation, appear acceptable.Additionally, Japan and the United
States could thereby provide the world with a model for reform. In the
short run, they could allow other countries to sign on, as other countries
79. See P.M. North, The Draft U.K/U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1
Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219 (1979); Hans Smit, The Proposed United States-United Kingdom
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Prototype for the Future?, 17
VA. J. IN'L L. 443 (1977).
80. See BoRN, supra note 43, at 938 n.23.
81. See supra note 31.
82. See supra text accompanying note 52.
83. See supra note 40.
84. See supra note 26.
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have expressed sincere interest in getting some agreement out of the Hague
negotiations. 85 In the middle run, these two countries could pursue bilat-
eral treaties with other partners. In the long run, when multilateral negoti-
ations revive, as they surely will, Japan and the United States would have at
the ready a treaty that could compete with the Brussels Regulation as a
model.
Conclusion
"Oh, East is East, and West is West,"'86 but the twain meet regularly in
international litigation. When they meet, despite surprisingly similar doc-
trine and outlook on matters of jurisdiction and judgments, Japanese and
U.S. legal systems often "clash head-on":8 7 jurisdictions overlap and judg-
ments may not be respected, while parallel proceedings persist. With
slight tweaking by a highly feasible bilateral agreement, the two systems
could harmonize for a better tomorrow in which jurisdiction was allocated
appropriately and judgments were respected accordingly, at least as
between these two countries that otherwise share so much.
85. See, e.g., David Goddard, Rethinking the Judgments Convention: A Pacific Per-
spective 9 (2001) (manuscript on file with author) (a New Zealander also observing the
necessity to Oceania that any jurisdiction and judgments convention be signed by Japan
and the United States).
86. RUDYARD KIPLING, The Ballad of East and West, in RUDYARD KIPLING'S VERSE 268
(1927).
87. Masato Dogauchi, Concurrent Litigations in Japan and the United States, 37 J~A,.
ANN. INT'L L. 72, 72 (1994) (noting, however, the lack of real data).
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